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Abstract
Save for some special cases, current training meth-
ods for Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)
are at best guaranteed to converge to a ‘local Nash
equilibrium’ (LNE). Such LNEs, however, can
be arbitrarily far from an actual Nash equilibrium
(NE), which implies that there are no guarantees
on the quality of the found generator or classifier.
This paper proposes to model GANs explicitly
as finite games in mixed strategies, thereby en-
suring that every LNE is an NE. With this for-
mulation, we propose a solution method that is
proven to monotonically converge to a resource-
bounded Nash equilibrium (RB-NE): by increas-
ing computational resources we can find better
solutions. We empirically demonstrate that our
method is less prone to typical GAN problems
such as mode collapse, and produces solutions
that are less exploitable than those produced by
GANs and MGANs, and closely resemble theo-
retical predictions about NEs.
1. Introduction
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) (Goodfellow
et al., 2014) are a framework in which two neural networks
compete with each other: the generator (G) tries to trick
the classifier (C) into classifying its generated fake data
as true. GANs hold great promise for the development of
accurate generative models for complex distributions. Con-
sequently, in just a few years, GANs have grown into a
major topic of research in machine learning. A core appeal
is that they do not need to rely on distance metrics (Li et al.,
2016). However, GANs are difficult to train (Unterthiner
et al., 2018; Arjovsky and Bottou, 2017; Arjovsky et al.,
2017). A typical problem is mode collapse, which can take
the form of mode omission, where the generator does not
produce points from certain modes, or mode degeneration,
∗This version supersedes our earlier arXiv paper (Oliehoek
et al., 2017).
in which for at least one mode the generator only partially
covers the mode. Moreover, while learning the players may
forget: e.g., it is possible that a classifier correctly learns
to classify part of the input space as ‘fake’ only to forget
this later when the generator no longer generates examples
in this part of space. In fact, except for very special cases
(cf. Section 7), the best current training methods can offer
(Heusel et al., 2017; Unterthiner et al., 2018) is a guarantee
to converge to a local Nash equilibrium (LNE) (Ratliff et al.,
2013). However, an LNE can be arbitrarily far from an NE
(which we will also refer to as ‘global NE’ to discriminate)
and the corresponding generator might be exploitable by
a strong opponent due to suffering from problems such as
mode collapse. Moreover, adding computational resources
alone may not offer a way to escape these local equilibria:
the problem does not lie in the lack of computational re-
sources, but is inherently the result of only allowing small
steps in strategy space using gradient-based training.
We introduce a novel approach that does not suffer from
getting trapped in LNEs: finite Generative Adversarial Net-
work Games (GANGs) formulate adversarial networks as
finite zero-sum games, and the solutions that we try to find
are saddle points in mixed strategies. This approach is moti-
vated by the observation that, considering a GAN as a finite
zero-sum game, in the space of mixed strategies, any local
Nash equilibrium is a global one. Intuitively, the reason
for this is that whenever there is a profitable pure strategy
deviation one can move towards it in the space of mixed
strategies.
Since we cannot expect to find exact best responses due to
the extremely large number of pure strategies that result for
sensible choices of neural network classes, we introduce
resource-bounded best-responses (RBBRs), and the cor-
responding resource-bounded Nash equilibrium (RB-NE),
which is a pair of mixed strategies in which no player can
find a better RBBR. This is richer than the notion of local
Nash equilibrium in that it captures not only failures of es-
caping local optima of gradient descent, but applies to any
approximate best response computations, including methods
with random restarts, and allows us to provide convergence
guarantees.
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The key features of our approach are that:
• It is based on finite zero-sum games, and as such it enables
the use of existing game-theoretic methods. In this paper
we focus on one such method, Parallel Nash Memory
(PNM) (Oliehoek et al., 2006).
• It will not get trapped in LNEs: we prove that it mono-
tonically converges to an RB-NE, which means that more
computation can improve solution quality.
• Moreover, it works for any network architecture (unlike
previous approaches, see Section 7). In particular, future
improvements in classifiers/generator networks can be
exploited directly.
We investigate empirically the effectiveness of PNM and
show that it can indeed deal well with typical GAN prob-
lems such as mode collapse and forgetting, especially in
distributions with asymmetric structure to their modes. We
show that the found solutions are much less susceptible to
being exploited by an adversary, and that they more closely
match the theoretical predictions made by Goodfellow et al.
(2014) about the conditions at a Nash equilibrium.
2. Background
We defer a more detailed treatment of related work on GANs
and recent game-theoretic approaches until Section 7. Here,
we introduce some basic game-theoretic notation.
Definition 1 (‘game’). A two-player strategic
game, which we will simply call ‘game’, is a tuple〈D, {Si}i∈D , {ui}i∈D〉, where D = {1, 2} is the set of
players, Si is the set of pure strategies (actions) for player i,
and ui : S → R is i′s payoff function defined on the set of
pure strategy profiles S := S1 × S2. When the action sets
are finite, the game is finite.
We also write si and s−i for the strategy of agent i and its
opponent respectively.
A fundamental concept is the Nash equilibrium (NE), which
is a strategy profile such that no player can unilaterally
deviate and improve his payoff.
Definition 2 (Pure Nash equilibrium). A pure strategy
profile s = 〈si, s−i〉 is an NE if and only if ui(s) ≥
ui(〈s′i, s−i〉) for all players i and s′i ∈ Si.
A finite game may not possess a pure NE. A mixed strategy
µi of player i is a probability distribution over i’s pure
strategies Si. The set of such probability distributions is
denoted by ∆(Si). The payoff of a player under a profile of
mixed strategies µ = 〈µ1, µ2〉 is defined as the expectation:
ui(µ) :=
∑
s∈S [
∏
j∈D µj(sj)] · ui(s).
Then an NE in mixed strategies is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Mixed Nash equilibrium). A µ = 〈µi, µ−i〉
is an NE if and only if ui(µ) ≥ ui(〈s′i, µ−i〉) for all players
i and potential unilateral deviations s′i ∈ Si.
Every finite game has at least one NE in mixed strate-
gies (Nash, 1950). In this paper we deal with two-player
zero-sum games, where u1(s1, s2) = −u2(s1, s2) for all
s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2. The equilibria of zero-sum games, also
called saddle points,1 have several important properties, as
stated in the Minmax theorem.
Theorem 1 (von Neumann (1928)). In a finite zero-sum
game, minµ2 maxµ1 u1(µ) = maxµ1 minµ2 u1(µ) = v
∗,
where v∗ is the value of the game.
All equilibria have payoff v∗ and equilibrium strategies
are interchangeable: if 〈µ1, µ2〉 and 〈µ′1, µ′2〉 are equilibria,
then so are 〈µ′1, µ2〉 and 〈µ1, µ′2〉 (Osborne and Rubinstein,
1994). This means that in zero-sum games we do not need
to worry about equilibrium selection: any equilibrium strat-
egy for a player is guaranteed to achieve the value of the
game. Moreover, the convex combination of two equilibria
is an equilibrium, meaning that the game has either one or
infinitely many equilibria.
We also employ the standard, additive notion of approximate
equilibrium:
Definition 4. A pair of (possibly pure) strategies (µi, µ−i)
is an -NE if ∀i ui(µi, µ−i) ≥ maxµ′i ui(µ′i, µ−i)− . In
other words, no player can gain more than  by deviating.
In the literature, GANs have not typically been considered as
finite games. The natural interpretation of the standard setup
of GANs is of an infinite game where payoffs are defined
over all possible weight parameters for the respective neural
networks. With this view we do not obtain existence of
saddle points in the space of parameters2, nor the desirable
properties of Theorem 1. Some results on the existence of
saddle points in infinite action games are known, but they
require properties like convexity and concavity of utility
functions (Aubin, 1998), which we cannot apply as they
would need to hold w.r.t. the neural network parameters.
This is why the notion of local Nash equilibrium (LNE) has
arisen in the literature (Ratliff et al., 2013; Unterthiner et al.,
2018). Roughly, an LNE is a strategy profile where neither
player can improve in a small neighborhood of the profile.3
1 Note that in game theory the term ‘saddle point’ is used to
denote a ‘global’ saddle point which corresponds to a Nash equi-
librium: there is no profitable deviation near or far away from
the current point. In contrast, in machine learning, the term ’sad-
dle point’ typically denotes a ‘local’ saddle point: no player can
improve its payoff by making a small step from the current joint
strategy.
2 Note that Goodfellow et al. (2014)’s theoretical results on the
existance of an equilibrium are “done in a non-parametric setting”
which studies “convergence in the space of probability density
functions”, not parameters.
3So this corresponds to a ‘local saddle point’. Cf. footnote 1.
In finite games every LNE is an NE, as, whenever there is
a global deviation (i.e., a better response), one can always
deviate locally in the space of mixed strategies towards a
pure best response (by playing that better response with 
higher probability).
3. GANGs
In order to capitalize on the insight that we can escape local
equilibria by switching to mixed strategy space for a finite
game, we formalize adversarial networks in a (finite) games
setting, that we call (finite) Generative Adversarial Network
Games (GANGs).
We start with making explicit how general (infinite) GANs
correspond to strategic games, via the GANG framework:
Definition 5 (GANG). A GANG is a tuple M =
〈pd, 〈G, pz〉 , C, φ〉 with
• pd(x) is the distribution over (‘true’ or ‘real’) data points
x ∈ Rd.
• G is a neural network class parametrized by a parameter
vector θG ∈ ΘG and d outputs, such that G(z; θG) ∈
Rd denotes the (‘fake’ or ‘generated’) output of G on a
random vector z drawn from some distribution z ∼ pz .
• C is a neural network class parametrized by a parameter
vector θC ∈ ΘC and a single output, such that the output
C(x; θC) ∈ [0, 1] indicates the ‘realness’ of x according
to C.
• φ : [0, 1]→ R is a measuring function (Arora et al.,
2017)—e.g., log for GANs, the identity mapping for
WGANs—used to specify game payoffs, explained next.
A GANG induces a zero-sum game in an intuitive way:
Definition 6. The induced zero-sum strategic-form game
of a GANG is 〈D = {G,C}, {SG,SC} , {uG, uC}〉 with:
• SG = {G(·; θG) | θG ∈ ΘG} the set of strategies sG;
• SC = {C(·; θC) | θC ∈ ΘC}, the set of strategies sC ;
• uC(sG, sC) = Ex∼pd [φ(sC(x))] −
Ez∼pz [φ(sC(sG(z)))]. I.e., the score of C is the
expected ‘measured realness’ of the real data minus that
of the fake data;
• uG(sG, sC) = −uC(sG, sC).
As such, when using φ = log, GANGs employ a payoff
function for G that use Goodfellow et al. (2014)’s trick to
enforce strong gradients early in the training process, but it
applies this transformation to uC too, in order to retain the
zero-sum property. The correctness of these transformations
are proven in Appendix A.
In practice, GANs are represented using floating point num-
bers, of which, for a given setup, there is only a finite (albeit
large) number. In GANGs, we formalize this:
Definition 7. Any GANG where G,C are finite classes—
i.e., classes of networks constructed from a finite set of node
types (e.g., {Sigmoid, ReLu, Linear})—and with architec-
tures of bounded size, is called a finite network class GANG.
A finite network class GANG in which the sets ΘG,ΘC are
finite too, it is called a finite GANG.
From now on, we will focus on finite GANGs. We empha-
size this finiteness, because this is exactly what enables us
to obtain the desirable properties mentioned in Section 2:
existence of (one or infinitely many) mixed NEs with the
same value, as well as the guarantee that any LNE is an NE.
Moreover, these properties hold for the GANG in its origi-
nal formulation—not for a theoretical abstraction in terms
of (infinite capacity) densities—which means that we can
truly expect solution methods (that operate in the paramet-
ric domain) to exploit these properties. However, since we
do not impose any additional constraints or discretization4,
the number of strategies (all possible unique instantiations
of the network class with floating point numbers) is huge.
Therefore, we think that finding (near-) equilibria with small
supports is one of the most important challenges for making
principled advances in the field of adversarial networks. As
a first step towards addressing this challenge, we propose to
make use of the Parallel Nash Memory (PNM) (Oliehoek
et al., 2006), which can be seen as a generalization (to non-
exact best responses) of the double oracle method (McMa-
han et al., 2003).
4. Resource-Bounded GANGs
While finite GANGs do not suffer from LNEs, solving them
is non-trivial: even though we know that there always is
a direction (i.e., a best response) that we can play more
frequently to move towards an NE, computing that direction
itself is a computationally intractable task. There is huge
number of candidate strategies and the best-response payoff
is a non-linear (or convex) function of the chosen strategy.
This means that finding an NE, or even an −NE will be
typically beyond our capabilities. Therefore we consider
players with bounded computational resources.
Resource-Bounded Best-Responses (RBBR). A Nash
equilibrium is defined by the absence of better responses for
any of the players. As such, best response computation is
a critical tool to verify whether a strategy profile is an NE,
4 Therefore, our finite GANGs have the same representational
capacity as normal GANs that are implemented using floating
point arithmetic. When strategies would be highly non-continuous
functions of θG and θC , then a discretization (e.g., a floating point
system) might be inadequate, but then GANs are not appropriate
either: neural networks are continuous functions.
and is also a common subroutine in algorithms that compute
an NE.5 However, since computing an (-)best response will
generally be intractable for GANGs, we examine the type
of solutions that we actually can expect to compute with
bounded computational power by the notion of resource-
bounded best response and show how it naturally leads to
the resource-bounded NE (RB-NE) solution concept.
We say that SRBi ⊆ Si is the subset of strategies of player
i, that i can compute as a best response, given its bounded
computational resources. This computable set is an abstract
formulation that can capture gradient descent being trapped
in local optima, as well as other phenomena that prevent us
from computing a best response (e.g., not even reaching a
local optimum in the available time).
Definition 8. A strategy si ∈ SRBi of player i is a resource-
bounded best-response (RBBR) against a (possibly mixed)
strategy µj , if ∀s′i ∈ SRBi , ui(si, µj) ≥ ui(s′i, µj).
That is, si only needs to be amongst the best strategies that
player i can compute in response to µj . We denote the set
of such RBBRs to µj by SRBBR(µj)i ⊆ SRBi .
Definition 9. A resource-bounded best-response function
fRBBRi : ∆(Sj)→ SRBi is a function that maps from the
set of possible strategies of player j to an RBBR for i, s.t.
∀µj fRBBRi (µj) ∈ SRBBR(µj)i .
Using RBBRs, we define an intuitive specialization of NE:
Definition 10. µ = 〈µi, µj〉 is a resource-bounded NE (RB-
NE) iff ∀i ui(µi, µj) ≥ ui(fRBBRi (µj), µj).
That is, an RB-NE can be thought of as follows: we present
µ to each player i and it gets the chance to switch to
another strategy, for which it can apply its bounded re-
sources (i.e., use fRBBRi ) exactly once. After this applica-
tion, the player’s resources are exhausted and if the found
fRBBRi (µj) does not lead to a higher payoff it will not have
an incentive to deviate.6
Clearly, an RB-NE can be linked to the familiar notion
of -NE by making assumptions on the power of the best
response computation.
5 We motivate the need for an alternative solution concept. We
acknowledge the fact that there are solution methods that do not
require the explicit computation for best responses, but are not
aware of any such methods that would be scalable to the huge
strategy spaces of finite GANGs.
6 Of course, during training the RBBR functions will be used
many times, and therefore the overall computations that we, the de-
signers (‘GANG trainers’), use is a multitude of the computational
capabilities that that the RB-NE assumes. However, this is of no
concern: the goal of the RB-NE is to provide a characterization of
the end point of training. In particular, it allows us to give an ab-
stract formalization of the idea that more computational resources
imply a better solution.
Theorem 2. If both players are powerful enough to compute
-best responses, then an RB-NE is an -NE.
Proof. Starting from the RB-NE (µi, µj), assume an
arbitrary i. By definition of RB-NE ui(µi, µj) ≥
ui(f
RBBR
i (µj), µj) ≥ maxµ′i ui(µ′i, µj)− .
Non-deterministic Best Responses. The above defi-
nitions assumed deterministic RBBR functions fRBBRi .
However, in many cases the RBBR function can be non-
deterministic (e.g., due to random restarts), which means
that the sets SRBi are non-deterministic. This is not a fun-
damental problem, however, and the same approach can be
adapted to allow for such non-determinism.
In particular, now let fRBBRi be a non-deterministic func-
tion, and define SRBi as the range of this function. That
is, we define SRBi as that set of strategies that our non-
deterministic RBBR function might deliver. Given this mod-
ification the definition of the RB-NE remains unchanged: a
strategy profile µ = 〈µi, µj〉 is a non-deterministic RB-NE
if each player i uses all its computational resources by call-
ing fRBBRi (µj) once, and no player finds a better strategy
to switch to.
5. Solving GANGs
Treating GANGs as finite games in mixed strategies permits
building on existing tools and algorithms for these classes of
games (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Rakhlin and Sridharan,
2013a; Foster et al., 2016). In this section, we describe how
to use the Parallel Nash Memory (Oliehoek et al., 2006),
which explicitly aims to prevent forgetting, is particularly
tailored to finding approximate NEs with small support, and
monotonically7 converges to such an equilibrium.
In the following, we give a concise description of a slightly
simplified form of Parallel Nash Memory (PNM) and how
we apply it to GANGs. For ease of explanation, we focus
on the setting with deterministic best responses.8
The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. Intuitively, PNM
7 For an explanation of the precise meaning of monotonic here,
we refer to Oliehoek et al. (2006). Roughly, we will be ‘secure’
against more strategies of the other agent with each iteration. This
does not imply that the worst case payoff for an agent also improves
monotonicaly. The latter property, while desirable, is not possible
with an approach that incrementally constructs sub-games of the
full game, as considered here: there might always be a part of the
game we have not seen yet, but which we might discover in the
future that will lead to a very poor worst case payoff for one of the
agents.
8 In our experiments, we use random initializations for the best
responses. To deal with this non-determinism we simply discard
any tests that are not able to find a positive payoff over the current
mixed strategy NE 〈µG, µC〉, but we do not terminate. Instead, we
run for a pre-specified number of iterations.
Algorithm 1 PARALLEL NASH MEMORY FOR GANGS
WITH DETERMINISTIC RBBRS
1: 〈sG, sC〉 ← INITIALSTRATEGIES()
2: 〈µG, µC〉 ← 〈{sG}, {sC}〉 . set initial mixtures
3: while True do
4: sG ← RBBR(µC) . get new bounded best resp.
5: sC ← RBBR(µG)
6: // Expected payoffs of these ‘tests’ against mixture:
7: uBRs ← uG(sG, µC) + uC(µG, sC)
8: if uBRs ≤ 0 then
9: break
10: end if
11: SG← AUGMENTGAME(SG, sG, sC)
12: 〈µG, µC〉 ← SOLVEGAME(SG)
13: end while
14: return 〈µG, µC〉 . found an BR-NE
incrementally grows a strategic game SG, over a number
of iterations, using the AUGMENTGAME function. It uses
SOLVEGAME to compute (via linear programming, see, e.g.,
Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008)) a mixed strategy NE
〈µG, µC〉 of this smaller game at the end of each iteration.
In order to generate new candidate strategies to include
in SG, at the beginning of each iteration the algorithm
uses a ‘search’ heuristic to deliver new promising strategies.
In our GANG setting, we use the resource-bounded best-
response (RBBR) functions of the players for this purpose.
After having found new strategies, we test if they ‘beat’ the
current 〈µG, µC〉, if they do, uBRs > 0, and the game is
augmented with these and solved again to find a new NE
of the sub-game SG. If they do not, uBRs ≤ 0, and the
algorithm stops.9
In order to augment the game, PNM evaluates (by simula-
tion) each newly found strategy for each player against all of
the existing strategies of the other player, thus constructing
a new row and column for the maintained payoff matrix.
In order to implement the best response functions, any exist-
ing neural network architectures can be used. However, we
need to compute RBBRs against mixtures of networks of the
other player. For C this is trivial: we can simply generate a
batch of fake data from the mixture µG. Implementing an
RBBR for G against µC is slightly more involved, as we
need to back-propagate the gradient from all the different
sC ∈ µC to G. Intuitively, one can think of a combined net-
work consisting of the G network with its outputs connected
to every sC ∈ µC (see Figure 1). The predictions yˆsC of
these components sC ∈ µC are combined in a single linear
9 Essentially, this is the same as the double oracle method,
but it replaces exact best-response computation with approximate
RBBRs. Therefore, we refer to this as PNM, since that inherently
allows for approximate/heuristic methods to deliver new ‘test’
strategies (Oliehoek et al., 2006). It also enables us to develop
a version for non-deterministic RBBRs, by literally adopting the
PNM algorithm.
output node yˆ =
∑
sC∈µC µC(sC) · yˆsC . This allows us
to evaluate and backpropagate through the entire network.
A practical implementation that avoids memory concerns
instead loops through each component sC ∈ µC and does
the evaluation of the weighted prediction µC(sC) · yˆsC and
subsequent backpropagation per component.
Intuitively, it is clear that PNM converges to an RB-NE,
which we now prove formally.
Theorem 3. If PNM terminates, it has found an RB-NE.
Proof. We show that uBRs ≤ 0 implies we have an RB-NE:
uBRs = uG(f
RBBR
G (µC), µC) + uC(µG, f
RBBR
C (µG))
≤ 0 = uG(µG, µC) + uC(µG, µC) (1)
Note that, per Def. 8, uG(fRBBRG (µC), µC) ≥ uG(s′G, µC)
for all computable s′G ∈ SRBG (and similar for C).
Therefore, the only way that uG(fRBBRG (µC), µC) ≥
uG(µG, µC) could fail to hold, is if µG would include some
strategies that are not computable (not in SRBG ) that pro-
vide higher payoff. However, as the support of µG is com-
posed of strategies computed in previous iterations, this
cannot be the case. We conclude uG(fRBBRG (µC), µC)
≥ uG(µG, µC) and similarly uC(µG, fRBBRC (µG)) ≥
uC(µG, µC). Together with (1) this directly implies
uG(µG, µC) = uG(f
RBBR
G (µC), µC) and uC(µG, µC) =
uC(µG, f
RBBR
C (µG)), indicating we found an RB-NE.
Corollary 1. Algorithm 1 terminates and monotonically
converges to an equilibrium.
Proof. This follows directly from the fact that there are
only finitely many RBBRs and the fact that we never forget
RBBRs that we computed before, thus the proof for PNM
(Oliehoek et al., 2006) extends to Algorithm 1.
The PNM algorithm for GANGs is parameter free, but we
mention two adaptations that are helpful.
Interleaved training of best responses. In order to speed
up convergence of PNM, it is possible to train best responses
of G and C in parallel, giving G access to the intermediate
results of fRBBRC . This reduces the number of needed
PNM iterations, but does not seem to affect the quality of
the found solutions, as demonstrated in Appendix D. The
results shown in the main paper do not employ this trick.
Regularization of classifier best responses. In initial ex-
periments, we found that the best-responses by C tended to
overfit—see the supplement for an extensive analysis. In
order to regularize best responses for C, in each iteration, in
the experiments below we sample additional data points x
uniformly from a bounding box enclosing the current data
..
.
.
.
Figure 1: Network architecture that allows gradients from sC ∈ µC to be back-propagated to G.
(both real and fake), and include these data points as ad-
ditional fake data for training C. The number of ‘uniform
fake points’ chosen coincides with the batch size used for
training.
6. Experiments
Here we report on experiments that aim to test if searching
in mixed strategies with PNM-GANG can help in reducing
problems with training GANs, and if the found solutions
(near-RB-NEs) provide better generative models and are po-
tentially closer to true Nash equilibria than those found by
GANs (near-LNEs). Since our goal is to produce better gen-
erative models, we refrain from evaluating these methods on
complex data like images: image quality and log likelihood
are not aligned as for instance shown by Theis et al. (2016).
Moreover there is debate about whether GANs are overfit-
ting (memorizing the data) and assessing this from samples
is difficult; only crude methods have been proposed e.g.,
(Arora and Zhang, 2017; Salimans et al., 2016; Odena et al.,
2017; Karras et al., 2018), most of which provide merely a
measure of variability, not over-fitting. As such, we choose
to focus on irrefutable results on mixture of Gaussian tasks,
for which the distributions can readily be visualized, and
which themselves have many applications.
Experimental setup. We compare our PNM approach
(‘PNM-GANG’) to a vanilla GAN implementation and state-
of-the-art MGAN (Hoang et al., 2018). Detailed training
and architecture settings are summarized in the appendix.
The mixture components comprise grids and annuli with
equal-variance components, as well as non-symmetric cases
with randomly located modes and with a random covariance
matrix for each mode. For each domain we create test cases
with 9 and 16 components. In our plots, black points are
real data, green points are generated data. Blue indicates
areas that are classified as ‘realistic’ while red indicates a
‘fake’ classification by C.
Found solutions. The results produced by regular GANs
and PNM-GANGs are shown in Figure 2 and clearly convey
three main points:
1. The PNM-GANG mixed classifier has a much flatter
surface than the classifier found by the GAN. Around
the true data, the GANG classifier outputs around 0.5
indicating indifference, which is in line with the theoreti-
cal predictions about the equilibrium (Goodfellow et al.,
2014).
2. We see that this flatter surface is not coming at the cost
of inaccurate samples. In contrast: nearly all samples
shown are hitting one of the modes and thus the PNM-
GANG solutions are highly accurate, much more so than
the GANs’ solutions.
3. Finally, the PNM-GANGs, unlike GANs, do not suffer
from mode omission; they leave out no modes. We also
note that PNM-GANG typically achieved these results
with fewer total parameters than the regular GAN, e.g.,
1463 vs. 7653 for the random 9 task in Figure 2.
This shows that, qualitatively, the use of multiple generators
seems to lead to good results. This is corroborated by results
we obtained using MGANs (illustrations and complete de-
scription can be found in Appendix C.2), which only failed
to represent one mode in the ‘random’ task.
Impact of generator learning rate. The above results
show that PNM-GANG can accurately cover multiple
Figure 2: Results for mixtures of Gaussians with 9 and 16 modes. Odd rows: PNM-GANG, Even rows: GAN. The
histograms represent the probabilities in the mixed strategy of each player. True data is shown in black, while fake data is
green. The classification boundary (where the classifier outputs 0.5) is indicated with a red line. Best seen in color.
modes, however, not all modes are fully covered. As also
pointed out by Arjovsky et al. (2017), the best response ofG
against µC is a single point with the highest ‘realness’, and
therefore the WGAN they introduced uses fewer iterations
for G than for C. Inspired by this, we investigate if we can
reduce the mode collapse by reducing the learning rate of G.
The results in Figure 3 show that more area of the modes
are covered confirming this hypothesis. However, it also
makes clear that by doing so, we are now generating some
data outside of the true data, so this is a trade-off. We point
out that also with total mode degeneration (where modes
collapse to Dirac delta peaks), the PNM mechanism theo-
retically would still converge, by adding in ever more delta
peaks covering parts of the modes.
Exploitability of solutions. Finally, to complement the
above qualitative analysis, we also provide a quantitative
analysis of the solutions found by GANs, MGANs and
PNM-GANGs. We investigate to what extent they are ex-
ploitable by newly introduced adversaries with some fixed
computational power (as modeled by the complexity of the
networks we use to attack the found solution).
In particular, for a given solution µ˜ = (µ˜G, µ˜C) we use the
following measure of exploitability:
explRB(µ˜G, µ˜C) , RBmaxµGuG(µG, µ˜C)
+ RBmaxµCuC(µ˜G, µC), (2)
where ‘RBmax’ denotes an approximate maximization per-
formed by an adversary of some fixed complexity.
That is, the ‘RBmax’ functions are analogous to the fRBBRi
functions employed in PNM, but the computational re-
sources of ‘RBmax’ could be different from those used
for the fRBBRi . Intuitively, it gives a higher score if µ˜ is
easier to exploit. However, it is not a true measure of dis-
tance to an equilibrium: it can return values that are lower
than zero which indicate that µ˜ could not be exploited by
the approximate best responses.
Our exploitability is closely related to the use of GAN train-
ing metrics (Im et al., 2018), but additionally includes the
exploitability of the classifier. This is important: when only
testing the exploitability of the generator, this does give a
way to compare generators, but it does not give a way to
assess how far from equilibirum we might be. Since finite
GANGs are zero-sum games, distance to equilibrium is the
desired performance measure. In particular, the exploitabil-
ity of the classifier actually may provide information about
the quality of the generator: if the generator holds up well
against a perfect classifier, it should be close to the data
distribution. For a further motivation of this measure of
exploitability, please see Appendix B.2.
We perform two experiments on the 9 random modes task;
Figure 3: Results for PNM with a learning rate of 7−4 for
the generator (top). Compare with previous result (bottom,
duplicated from the first row of Figure 2).
results for other tasks are in Appendix C.2. First, we in-
vestigate the exploitability of solutions delivered by GANs,
MGANs and GANGs of different complexities (in terms of
total number of parameters used). For this, we compute ‘at-
tacks’ (approximate best responses) to these solutions using
attackers of fixed complexity (a total of 453 parameters for
the attacking G and C together).
These results are shown in Figure 4 (left and middle). The
left plot shows the exploitability of PNM-GANG after dif-
ferent numbers of iterations, as well as the number of param-
eters used in the solutions found in those iterations (a sum
over all the networks in the support of the mixture). Error
bars indicate standard deviation. It is apparent that PNM-
GANG solutions with more parameters typically are less
exploitable. Also shown is that the variance of exploitability
depends heavily on the solution that we happen to attack.
The middle plot shows those same results together with
exploitability results we obtained for GANs and MGANs
of different complexities (all were trained to convergence).
Figure 4: Exploitability results for the nine randomly located modes task. Left: exploitability of PNM-GANGs of various
complexities (indicated numbers) found in different iterations. Middle: comparison of exploitability of PNM-GANGs,
GANs and MGAN of various complexities. Right: exploitability of PNM-GANGs, GANs and MGAN, when varying the
complexity of the attacking ‘RBmax’ functions. Complexities are expressed in total number of parameters (for G and C
together). See text for detailed explanation of all.
Note that here the x-axis shows the complexity in terms
of total parameters. The figure shows an approximately
monotonic decrease in exploitability for GANGs for in-
creasing number of parameters, while GANs and MGANs
with higher complexity are still very exploitable. In con-
trast to GANGs, more complex architectures for GANs or
MGANs are thus by no means a way to guarantee a better
solution.
Secondly, we investigate what happens for the converged
GAN / PNM-GANG solution of Figure 2, which have com-
parable complexities, when attacked with varying complex-
ity attackers. We also employ an MGAN which has a
significantly larger number of parameters (see Appendix
C.2). These results are shown in Figure 4 (right). Clearly
shown is that the PNM-GANG is robust with near-zero
exploitability even when attacked with high complexity
attackers. The MGAN solution has a non-zero level of
exploitability, roughly constant for several attacker com-
plexities. In stark contrast, we see that the converged GAN
solution is exploitable already for low-complexity attackers,
again suggesting that the GAN was stuck in an LNE far
away from a global NE.
Overall, these results demonstrate that GANGs can provide
more robust solutions than GANs/MGANs with the same
number of parameters, suggesting that they are closer to a
Nash equilibrium and provide better generative models.
7. Related work
Progress in zero-sum games. Bosanský et al. (2014) de-
vise a double-oracle algorithm for computing exact equi-
libria in extensive-form games with imperfect information.
Their algorithm uses best-response oracles; PNM does so
too, though in this paper using resource-bounded rather than
exact best responses. Lanctot et al. (2017) generalize to
non-exact sub-game routines. Inspired by GANs, Hazan
et al. (2017) deal with general zero-sum settings with non-
convex loss functions. They introduce a weakening of local
equilibria known as smoothed local equilibria and provide
algorithms with guarantees on the smoothed local regret. In
contrast, we introduce a generalization of local equilibrium
(RB-NE) that allows for stronger notions of equilibrium, not
only weaker ones, depending on the power of the RBBR
functions. For the more restricted class of convex-concave
zero-sum games, it was recently shown that Optimistic Mir-
ror Descent (a variant of gradient descent) and its general-
ization Optimistic Follow-the-Regularized-Leader achieve
faster convergence rates than gradient descent (Rakhlin and
Sridharan, 2013a;b). These algorithms have been explored
in the context of GANs by Daskalakis et al. (2018). How-
ever, the convergence results do not apply as GANs are not
convex-concave.
GANs. The literature on GANs has been growing at an
incredible rate, and a full overview of all the related works
such as those by Arjovsky et al. (2017); Arjovsky and Bot-
tou (2017); Huszár (2015); Nowozin et al. (2016); Dai et al.
(2017); Zhao et al. (2017); Arora and Zhang (2017); Sal-
imans et al. (2016); Gulrajani et al. (2017); Radford et al.
(2015) is beyond the scop of this paper. Instead we refer
to Unterthiner et al. (2018) for a reasonable comprehensive
recent overview.
Unterthiner et al. (2018) introduce Coulomb GANs and
show convergence for them but only under the strong as-
sumption that the “generator samples can move freely”
(which is not the case when training via gradient descent;
samples can only move small steps). Moreover, their ap-
proach essentially performs non-parametric density estima-
tion, which is based on the (Euclidean) distance between
data points, which we believe undermines one of the most
attractive features of GANs (not needing a distance metric).
Karras et al. (2018), like PNM, incrementally grow the com-
plexity of the maintained models, but, unlike PNM, do not
maintain a mixture. Many of the techniques designed to im-
prove GAN training, e.g., (Salimans et al., 2016; Gulrajani
et al., 2017; Sønderby et al., 2017; Creswell et al., 2018),
concern modifications to the update for one or both players.
Such techniques can directly be used in GANGs by adapting
the best response computation.
Explicit representations of mixtures of strategies. Re-
cently, more researchers have investigated the idea of (more
or less) explicitly representing a set or mixture of strategies
for the players. For instance, Jiwoong Im et al. (2016) re-
tains sets of networks that are trained by randomly pairing
up with a network for the other player thus forming a GAN.
This, like PNM, can be interpreted as a coevolutionary ap-
proach, but unlike PNM, it does not have any convergence
guarantees.
MAD-GAN (Ghosh et al., 2017) uses k generators, but
one discriminator. MGAN (Hoang et al., 2018) proposes
mixtures of k generators, a classifier and a discriminator
with weight sharing; and presents a theoretical analysis sim-
ilar to Goodfellow et al. (2014) assuming infinite capacity
densities. Unlike PNM, none of these approaches have
convergence guarantees.
Generally, explicit mixtures can bring advantages in two
ways: (1) Representation: intuitively, a mixture of k neu-
ral networks could better represent a complex distribution
than a single neural network of the same size, and would
be roughly on par with a single network that is k times as
big. Arora et al. (2017) show how to create such a bigger
network that is particularly suitable for dealing with multi-
ple modes using a ‘multi-way selector’. In our experiments
we observed mixtures of simpler networks leading to bet-
ter performance than a single larger network of the same
total complexity (in terms of number of parameters). (2)
Training: Arora et al. use an architecture that is tailored
to representing a mixture of components and train a single
such network. We, in contrast, explicitly represent the mix-
ture; given the observation that good solutions will take the
form of a mixture. This is a form of domain knowledge that
facilitates learning and convergence guarantees.
The most closely related paper that we know of is the work
by Grnarova et al. (2017), which also builds upon game-
theoretic tools to give certain convergence guarantees. The
main differences are as follows:
1. We provide a more general form of convergence (to an
RB-NE) that is applicable to all architectures, that only
depends on the power to compute best responses, and
show that PNM-GANG converges in this sense. We also
show that if agents can compute an -best response, then
the procedure converges to an -NE.
2. Grnarova et al. (2017) show that for a quite specific
GAN architecture their first algorithm converges to an
-NE. On the one hand, this result is an instantiation of
our more general theory: they assume they can compute
exact (for G) and -approximate (for C) best responses;
for such powerful players our Theorem 2 provides that
guarantee. On the other hand, their formulation works
without discretizing the spaces of strategies.
3. The practical implementation of their algorithm does not
provide guarantees.
Bounded rationality. The proposed notion of RB-NE is
one of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955). Over the years a
number of different such notions have been proposed, e.g.,
see Russell (1997); Zilberstein (2011). Some of these also
target agents in games. Perhaps the most well-known such
a concept is the quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey
and Palfrey, 1995). Other concepts take into account an ex-
plicit cost of computation (Rubinstein, 1986; Halpern et al.,
2014), or explicitly limit the allowed strategy, for instance
by limiting the size of finite-state machines that might be
employed (Halpern et al., 2014). However, these notions
are motivated to explain why people might show certain
behaviors or how a decision maker should use its limited
resources. We on the other hand, take the why and how
of bounded rationality as a given, and merely model the
outcome of a resource-bounded computation (as the com-
putable set SRBi ⊆ Si). In other words, we make a minimal
assumption on the nature of the resource-boundedness, and
aim to show that even under such general assumptions we
can still reach a form of equilibrium, an RB-NE, of which
the quality can be directly linked (via Theorem 2) to the
computational power of the agents.
8. Conclusions
We introduce finite GANGs—Generative Adversarial Net-
work Games—a novel framework for representing adversar-
ial networks by formulating them as finite zero-sum games.
By tackling them with techniques working in mixed strate-
gies we can avoid getting stuck in local Nash equilibria
(LNE). As finite GANGs have extremely large strategy
spaces we cannot expect to exactly (or -approximately)
solve them. Therefore, we introduced the resource-bounded
Nash equilibrium (RB-NE). This notion is richer than LNE
in that it captures not only failures of escaping local optima
of gradient descent, but applies to any approximate best-
response computations, including methods with random
restarts.
Additionally, GANGs can draw on a rich set of methods
for solving zero-sum games (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998;
Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2013b; Foster et al., 2016; Oliehoek
et al., 2006). In this paper, we build on PNM and prove that
the resulting method monotonically converges to an RB-
NE. We empirically demonstrate that the resulting method
does not suffer from typical GAN problems such as mode
collapse and forgetting. We also show that the GANG-
PNM solutions are closer to theoretical predictions, and are
less exploitable than normal GANs: by using PNM we can
train models that are more robust than GANs of the same
total complexity, indicating they are closer to a global Nash
equilibrium and yield better generative performance.
Future work We presented a framework that can have
many instantiations and modifications. For example, one
direction is to employ different learning algorithms. Another
direction could focus on modifications of PNM, such as to
allow discarding “stale” pure strategies, which would allow
the process to run for longer without being inhibited by
the size of the resulting zero-sum “subgame” that must be
maintained and repeatedly solved. The addition of fake
uniform data as a guiding component suggests that there
might be benefit of considering “deep-interactive learning”
where there is deepness in the number of players that interact
in order to give each other guidance in adversarial training.
This could potentially be modelled by zero-sum polymatrix
games (Cai et al., 2016).
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A. The zero-sum formulation of GANs and GANGs
In contrast to much of the GAN-literature, we explicitly formulate GANGs as being zero-sum games. GANs (Goodfellow
et al., 2014) formulate the payoff of the generator as a function of the fake data only: uG = Ez∼pz [φ (1− sC(sG(z)))].
However, it turns out that this difference typically has no implications for the sought solutions. We clarify this with the
following theorem, and investigate particular instantiations below. In game theory, two games are called strategically
equivalent if they possess exactly the same set of Nash equilibria; this (standard) definition is concerned only about the
mixed strategies played in equilibrium and not the resulting payoffs. The following is a well-known game transformation
(folklore, see Liu (1996)) that creates a new strategically equivalent game:
Fact 1. Consider a game Γ=〈{1, 2}, {S1,S2}, {u1, u2}〉. Fix a pure strategy s2 ∈ S2. Define u¯1 as identical to u1 except
that u¯1(si, s2) = u1(si, s2) + c for all si ∈ S1 and some constant c. We have that Γ and Γ¯=〈{1, 2}, {S1,S2}, {u¯1, u2}〉
are strategically equivalent.
Theorem 4. Let FakeC(sG, sC), and RealC(sC) be arbitrary functions, then any finite (non-zero-sum) two-player game
between G and C with payoffs of the following form:
uG = FakeG(sG, sC) , −FakeC(sG, sC),
uC = RealC(sC) + FakeC(sG, sC),
is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game where G has instead payoff u¯G , −RealC(sC)− FakeC(sG, sC).
Proof. By adding−RealC(sC) to G’s utility function, for each pure strategy sC of C we add a different constant to all
utilities of G against sC . Thus, by applying Fact 1 iteratively for all sC ∈ SC we see that we produce a strategically
equivalent game.
Next, we formally specify the conversion of existing GAN models to GANGs. We consider the general measure function
that covers GANs (φ(x) = log(x)) and WGANs (φ(x) = x− 1). In these models, the payoffs are specified as
uG(sG, sC) , −Ez∼pz [φ (1− sC (sG(z)))] ,
uC(sG, sC) , Ex∼pd [φ (sC(x))] +Ez∼pz [φ (1− sC (sG(z)))] .
These can be re-written using FakeC(sG, sC) = Ez∼pz [φ (1− sC (sG(z)))] and RealC(sC) = Ex∼pd [φ (sC(x))]. This
means that we can employ Theorem 4 and equivalently define a GANG with zero-sum payoffs that preserves the NEs.
In practice, most work on GANs uses a different objective, introduced by Goodfellow et al. (2014). They say that [formulas
altered]:
“Rather than training G to minimize log(1 − sC(sG(z))) we can train G to maximize log sC(sG(z)). This
objective function results in the same fixed point of the dynamics of G and C but provides much stronger gradients
early in learning.”
This means that they redefine uG(sG, sC) , Ez∼pz [φ (sC (sG(z)))] , which still can be written as FakeG(sG, sC) =
Ez∼pz [φ (sC (sG(z)))], which means that it is candidate for transformation to u¯G. Now, as long as the classifier’s payoff
is also adapted we can still write the payoff functions in the form of Theorem 4. That is, the trick is compatible with a
zero-sum formulation, as long as it is also applied to the classifier. This then yields:
uC(sG, sC) = Ex∼pd [φ(sC(x))]−Ez∼pz [φ(sC(sG(z)))]. (3)
B. Experimental setup
Table 1 summarizes the settings for GAN and PNM training. As suggested by (Chintala, 2016), we use leaky ReLU as inner
activation for our GAN implementation to avoid sparse gradients. Generators have linear output layers. Classifiers use
sigmoids for the final layer. Both classifiers and generators are multi-layer perceptrons with 3 hidden layers. We do not use
techniques such as Dropout or Batch Normalization, as they did not yield significant improvements in the quality of our
experimental results. The MGAN configuration is identical to that of Table 3 in Appendix C1 of Hoang et al. (2018).
GAN RBBR
Learning Rate 3 · 10−4 5 · 10−3
Batch Size 128 128
Z Dimension 40 5
H Dimension 50 5
Iterations 20000 750
Generator Parameters 4902 92
Classifier Parameters 2751 61
Inner Activation Leaky ReLU Leaky ReLU
Measuring Function log 10−5-bounded log
Table 1: Settings used to train GANs and RBBRs.
Figure 5: Illustration of exploitation of ‘overfitted’ classifier best-response.
B.1. Using uniform fake data to regularize classifier best responses
Plain application of PNM. In GANGs, G informs C about what good strategies are and vice versa. However, as we will
make clear here, this G has limited incentive to provide the best possible training signal to C.
This is illustrated in Figure 5. The left two figures show the same best response by C: zoomed in on the data and zoomed
out to cover some fake outliers. Clearly, C needs to find creative solutions to try and both remove the faraway points and
also do good near the real data. As a result, it ends up with the shown narrow beams in an effort to give high score to the
true data points (a very broad beam would lower their scores), but this exposes C to being exploited in later iterations: G
needs to merely shift the samples to some other part of the vast empty space around the data.
This phenomenon is nicely illustrated by the remaining three plots (that are from a different training run, but illustrate it
well): the middle plot shows an NE that targets one beam, this is exploited by G in its next best response (fourth image, note
the different scales on the axes, the ‘beam’ is the same). The process continues, and C will need to find mixtures of all these
type of complex counter measures (rightmost plot). This process can take a long time.
PNM with added uniform fake data. The GANG formalism allows us to incorporate a simple way to resolve this issue
and make training more effective. In each iteration, we look at the total span (i.e., bounding box) of the real and fake data
combined, and we add some uniformly sampled fake data in this bounded box (we used the same amount as fake data
produced by G). In that way, we further guide C in order to better guide the generator (by directly making clear that all the
area beyond the true data is fake). The impact of this procedure is illustrated by Figure 6, which shows the payoffs that the
maintained mixtures µG, µC achieve against the RBBRs computed against them (so this is a measure of security), as well as
the ‘payoff for tests’ (uBR). Clearly, adding uniform fake data leads to much faster convergence. As such, we perform our
main comparison to GANs with this uniform fake data component added in.
B.2. A measure of exploitability
GANGs are guaranteed to converge to an RB-NE, while GANs (in the best case) only converge to a local NE (LNE).
Therefore we hypothesize that GANGs, given sufficient computational power, yield better solutions that are ‘closer to a Nash
equilibrium’. This is important, even in settings where we only care about the performance of the generator: by formulating
the problem as a game (GAN or GANG), we have committed to approach the problem by trying to find an NE (even if that is
computationally intractable).
Figure 6: Convergence without (left) and with (right) adding uniform fake data. Shown is payoff as a function of the number
of iterations of PNM: generator (blue), classifier (green), tests (red). The tests that do not generate positive payoff (red line
< 0) are not added to the mixture.
Here we propose a measure to test how far from a Nash equilibrium we might be by measuring to what extent the found
solution is exploitable by adversaries of some complexity. While this is far from a perfect measure, ourselves only being
equipped with bounded computational resources, this might be the best we can do.
In particular, recall that at an NE, we realize the value of the game:
min
µC
max
µG
uG(µG, µC) = max
µG
min
µC
uG(µG, µC) = v
∗ (4)
In other words, for an equilibrium 〈µ∗G, µ∗C〉 we have that:
max
µG
uG(µG, µ
∗
C) = v
∗ (5)
min
µC
uG(µ
∗
G, µC) = v
∗ = min
µC
−uC(µ∗G, µC) = −max
µC
uC(µ
∗
G, µC) (6)
which means that maxµC uC(µ
∗
G, µC) = −v∗. It also means that if we would know v∗, we would be able to say ‘how far
away’ some found µ˜C is from an equilibrium strategy µ∗C (in terms of value) by looking at the best-response exploitability:
explBR(µ˜C) = max
µG
uG(µG, µ˜C)− v∗ ≥ 0 (7)
where the inequality holds assuming we can find the actual best response. Similarly for a µ˜G we can have a look at
min
µC
uG(µ˜G, µC)− v∗ ≤ 0
I.e., if µ˜G is an equilibrium strategy minµC uG(µ˜G, µC) = v
∗ but if µ˜G is less robust, the minimum is going to be lower
leading to a negative value of the expression (again assuming perfect best response µC). Since negative numbers are
unnatural to interpret as a distance, we define (again, assuming perfect best response computation):
explBR(µ˜G) = v
∗ −min
µC
uG(µ˜G, µC) = v
∗ + max
µC
−uG(µ˜G, µC) = v∗ + max
µC
uC(µ˜G, µC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
at least−v∗
≥ 0 (8)
Note that, expanding the payoff function, and realizing that the maximum will be attained at a deterministic strategy sC :
explBR(µ˜G) = v
∗ + max
sC
(
Ex∼pd [φ(sC(x))] +Ez∼pz,z∼µ˜G(z) [φ(1− sC(x))]
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
‘training divergence or metric’
,
which means this exploitability corresponds “to optimizing the divergence and distance metrics that were used to train the
GANs” (Im et al., 2018), offset by v∗.
In the theoretical non-parametric setting (with infinite capacity densities as the strategies) this is directly useful, because
then we know that the generator is able to exactly match the density, and that v∗ = log 4 (for the log measuring function,
which leads to a correspondence to the Jensen-Shannon divergence (Goodfellow et al., 2014)), since C will not be able to
discriminate (give higher ‘realness score’ to) real data from on fake data.
However, this may not be a score that is attainable in finite GANG or GANs: First, there might not be a (mixture of) neural
networks in the considered class that will match the data density, second there might not be classifier strategies that perfectly
classify this discrepancy between the true and generated fake data. Which means that we can not deduce v∗. Therefore,
even when we assume we can compute perfect best responses, in the finite setting computing these distances might not be
sufficient to determine how far from a Nash equilibrium we are. Like Im et al. (2018) and others before them, one might
hope that using a neural network classifier to compute a finite approximation to the aforementioned divergences and metrics.,
i.e., approximating explBR(µ˜G), will still give a way to compare generators (and it does), but it does not tell how far from
equilibrium one is.
However, even though we do not know v∗, in the case where we can compute perfect best responses, we can compute a
notion of distance of a tuple 〈µ˜G, µ˜C〉 to equilibrium by looking at the sum:
explBR(µ˜G, µ˜C) , explBR(µ˜C) + explBR(µ˜G) =(
max
µG
uG(µG, µ˜C)− v∗
)
+
(
v∗ + max
µC
uC(µ˜G, µC)
)
= max
µG
uG(µG, µ˜C) + max
µC
uC(µ˜G, µC) (9)
So by reasoning about the tuple (µ˜G, µ˜C) rather than only µ˜G, we are able to eliminate the factor of uncertainty: v∗.
We therefore propose to take this approach, also in the case where we cannot guarantee computing best responses (the
second factor of uncertainty). However, note that in (9), since both terms are guaranteed to be larger than 0, we do not need
to worry about cancellations of terms and the measure will never underestimate. This is no longer the case when using
approximate maximization. Still we can define a resource-bounded variant:
explRB(µ˜G, µ˜C) , (RBmaxµGuG(µG, µ˜C)− v∗) + (v∗ + RBmaxµCuC(µ˜G, µC)) (10)
= RBmaxµGuG(µG, µ˜C) + RBmaxµCuC(µ˜G, µC). (11)
It does not eliminate the second source of uncertainty, but neither does approximating explBR(µ˜G). This is a perfectly
useful tool (a lower bound to be precise) to get some information about the distance to an equilibrium, as long as we are
careful with its interpretation. In particular, since either or both of the terms of (10) could end up being lower than 0
(due to failure of computing an exact best response), we might end up underestimating the distance, and we can even get
negative values. However, explRB is still useful for comparing different found solution pairs 〈µ˜G, µ˜C〉 and
〈
µ˜G
′, µ˜C ′
〉
as
long as we use the same computational resources to compute approximate best responses against them. Negative values of
explRB(µ˜G, µ˜C) should be interpreted as “robust up to our computational resources to attack it”.
C. Additional empirical results
C.1. Low generator learning rate
Figure 7 shows the results of a lower learning rate for the generator for all 9 mode tasks. The general picture is the same as
for the random 9 modes task treated in the main paper: the modes are better covered by fake data, but in places we see that
this is at the expense of accuracy.
C.2. Exploitability results
MGAN Hoang et al. (2018) proposes a setup with a mixture of k generators, a classifier, and a discriminator. In their
setting, the generator mixture aims to create samples which match the training data distribution, while the discriminator
Figure 7: Results for PNM with a learning rate of 7−4 for the generator. Compare with the first row of Figure 2.
distinguishes real and generated samples, and the classifier tries to determine which generator a sample comes from. Similar
to Goodfellow et al. (2014), MGAN presents a theoretical analysis assuming infinite capacity densities. We use MGAN as a
state-of-the art baseline that was explicitly designed to overcome the problem of mode collapse.
Figure 8 shows the results of MGAN on the mixture of Gaussian tasks. MGAN results were obtained with an architecture
and hyperparameters which exactly match those proposed by Hoang et al. (2018) for a similar task. This means that the
MGAN models shown use many more parameters (approx. 310,000) than the GAN and GANG models (approx. 2,000).
MGAN requires the number of generators to be chosen upfront as a hyperparameter of the method. We chose this to be
equal to the number of mixture components, so that MGAN could cover all modes with one generator per mode. We note
that PNM does not require such a hyperparameter to be set, nor does PNM require the related “diversity” hyperparameter of
the MGAN method (called β in the MGAN paper).
Looking at Figure 8, we see that MGAN results do seem qualitatively quite good, even though there is one missed mode
(and thus also one mode covered by 2 generators) on the randomly located components task (right column).
Figure 8: Results for MGAN on several mixture of Gaussian tasks with 9 modes. Markers correspond to samples created by
each generator.
Figure 9 shows our exploitability results for all three tasks with nine modes. We observe roughly the same trend across the
three tasks. The left column plots show the exploitability of GANG after different numbers of iterations (with respect to an
attacker of fixed complexity: 453 parameters for the attacking G and C together), as well as the number of parameters used
in the solutions found in those iterations (a sum over all the networks in the support of the mixture for both players). Error
bars indicate standard deviations over 15 trials. Note how the exploitability of the found solution monotonically decreases as
the PNM iterations increase.
The middle column shows how exploitable GAN, MGAN and PNM-GANG models of different complexities are: the x-axis
indicates the total number of parameters, while the y-axis shows the exploitability. The PNM results are the same points also
Figure 9: Exploitability results all 9 mode tasks. Top to bottom: round, grid, random.
shown in the left column, but repositioned at the appropriate place on the x-axis. All data points are exploitability of models
that were trained until convergence. Note that here the x-axis shows the complexity in terms of total parameters. The figure
shows an approximately monotonic decrease in exploitability for GANGs, while GANs and MGANs with higher complexity
are still very exploitable in many cases. In contrast to GANGs, more complex architectures for GANs or MGANs are thus
not necessarily a way to guarantee a better solution.
Additionally, we investigate the exploitability of the trained models presented in Figure 1 when attacked by neural networks
of varying complexity. These results are shown in the right column of Figure 9. Clearly shown is that the PNM-GANG is
robust with near-zero exploitability even when attacked with high-complexity attackers. The MGAN models also have low
exploitability, but recall that these models are much more complex (GANG and GAN models have approximately 2,000
parameters, while the MGAN model involves approximately 310,000 parameters). Even with such a complex model, in the
‘random’ task, the MGAN solution has a non-zero level of exploitability, roughly constant for several attacker complexities.
This is related to the missed mode and the fact that two of the MGAN generators collapsed to the same lower-right mode
in Figure 1. In stark contrast to both PNM-GANGs and MGAN, we see that the converged GAN solution is exploitable
already for low-complexity attackers, again suggesting that the GAN was stuck in an Local Nash Equilibrium far away from
a (global) Nash Equilibrium.
As stated in the main paper, the variance of the exploitability depends critically on the solution that is attacked. The top row
of Figure 10 shows the results of three different attacks of the G against the µC found by the GAN (top), and PNM-GANG
(bottom). We see that in the top row, due to the shape of µC , the attacking generators reliably find the blue region with large
classifier scores. On the other hand, in the bottom row, we see that the attacking generators sometimes succeed in finding a
blue area, but sometimes get stuck in a local optimum (bottom left plot).
These results demonstrate that PNM-GANGs can provide more robust solutions than GANs/MGANs with the same number
of parameters, suggesting that they are closer to a Nash equilibrium and provide better generative models.
Figure 10: Found best response generators against a fixed GAN (top) and PNM-GANG (bottom) classifier.
D. Interleaved training for faster convergence
In order to speed up convergence of PNM-GANG, it is possible to train best responses of G and C in parallel, giving G
access to the intermediate results of fRBBRC . The resulting algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
In this case, the loss with which G is trained depends not only on the scores given by the current mixture of classifiers, µC ,
but also on the classification scores given by C. Formally, the new proposed loss for G is a weighted sum of the losses
if it were to be evaluated against µC and C, respectively. Clearly, the best response computation presented in the paper
corresponds to the case in which the weight of the loss coming from C is zero. Intuitively, this gives the generator player the
chance to be one-step ahead of the discriminator in discovering modes that are not being currently covered by µG.
This technique may interfere with the convergence guarantees provided above. It might not be the case that we are in fact
computing a resource-bounded best-response for G anymore. However, in practice it performs very well: it reduces the
Algorithm 2 INTERLEAVED TRAINING PNM FOR GANGS
1: 〈sG, sC〉 ← INITIALSTRATEGIES()
2: 〈µG, µC〉 ← 〈{sG}, {sC}〉 . set initial mixtures
3: while True do
4: while Training do
5: sC ← GRADIENTSTEPC(µG)
6: sG ← GRADIENTSTEPG(µC , sC)
7: end while
8: // Expected payoffs of these ‘tests’ against mixture:
9: uBRs ← uG(sG, µC) + uC(µG, sC)
10: if uBRs ≤ 0 then
11: break
12: end if
13: SG← AUGMENTGAME(SG, sG, sC)
14: 〈µG, µC〉 ← SOLVEGAME(SG)
15: end while
16: return 〈µG, µC〉
number of needed PNM iterations, but does not affect the quality of the found solutions, as demonstrated in Figure 11.
Normal best responses Interleaved training
29 PNM iterations: 24 PNM iterations:
40 PNM iterations: 25 PNM iterations:
40 PNM iterations: 18 PNM iterations:
Figure 11: Interleaved training. The left column shows normal training, as used in the main paper; the right column shows
interleaved training. In all cases, we manually picked the first iteration where all modes are covered. This consistently took
less iterations for interleaved training, while solution quality was comparable.
